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ABSTRACT Software-defined network (SDN) provides a solution for the scalable network framework with
decoupled control and data plane. Migrating switches can balance the resource utilization of controllers
and improve network performance. Switch migration problem has to date been formulated as a resource
utilization maximization problem to address the scalability of the control plane. However, this problem is
NP-hard with high-computational complexities and without addressing the security challenges of the control
plane. In this paper, we propose a switch migration method, which interprets switch migration as a signature
matching problem and is formulated as a 3-D earth mover’s distance model to protect strategically important
controllers in the network. Considering the scalability, we further propose a heuristic method which is
time-efficient and suitable to large-scale networks. Simulation results show that our proposed methods can
disguise strategically important controllers by diminishing the difference of traffic load between controllers.
Moreover, our proposed methods can significantly relieve the traffic pressure of controllers and prevent
saturation attacks.
INDEX TERMS Earth mover’s distance, load balancing, reconnaissance, saturation attacks, switch
migration.
I. INTRODUCTION
Distributed control plane is a promising technique in
software-defined networks (SDN) to achieve reliability and
scalability [1], [2]. This type of network usually hosts mul-
tiple controllers which are responsible for deciding how
packets should be forwarded by switches. As connections
between controllers and switches are mostly static, they can-
not adapt to the changes of network and thus, controllers
may suffer load imbalance and performance degradation with
the increase of network scale [3]. The controller placement
problem [4] has been widely researched to optimize the per-
formance of network by deciding where and how many con-
trollers to be placed. However, it requires frequently changing
the locations of controllers.
On the other hand, it is a key issue to prevent con-
trollers, especially the strategically located important ones,
from threats and attacks to enhance the security of network
control plane. In SDN, switches send PACKET_IN packets
to controllers to request routing information when flow table
has no entry to match traffic flows. This event is specially
utilized by adversaries to launch attacks to overload or even
crash down the controllers [5], [6]. Furthermore, the failure
of heavily-loaded controllers may even cause the cascading
failures of other controllers [7], [8].
In general, the switch migration problem is an NP-hard
constrained node selection problem [9]. It has been for-
mulated to be a resource utilization maximization problem
with constraints of CPU, bandwidth, and memory of con-
trollers [10]. The current solutions for this problem are typ-
ically heuristic, such as Markov approximation [3], greedy
method [11], and so on. These methods focus on improving
the performance or scalability of control plane, which hardly
claim either optimality or security in any sense. Moreover,
strategically located controllers may handle more traffic than
others, which makes them easy to be recognized or saturated.
There is few work focuses on the security issues to protect
these important nodes from attacks.
In this paper, we propose a dynamic load balancingmethod
to migrate switches by altering logical topology of SDN,
aiming at improving the scalability and security of control
plane. Our key idea is to interpret the switch migration as a
signature matching problem which in turn can be formulated
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as a three-dimensional earth mover’s distance (EMD) model.
Further considering resilience and computational efficiency,
we also develop suboptimal algorithms with polynomial
time-complexities. Simulation results show that our algo-
rithms are able to suppress traffic difference among con-
trollers and protect them from reconnaissance and saturation
attacks. Time-efficiency of our methods is also evaluated,
which confirms that the proposed suboptimal algorithms can
be applied to large-scale networks.
The rest of paper is organized as follows. Section II
presents related work. Section III describes the system and
network model. We also introduce the implementation of sys-
tem and the definition of EMD in this section. In Section IV,
we discuss the detail of designed algorithm. We present the
computational efficient heuristics in Section V. Section VI
evaluates the experiment results of our algorithm. We con-
clude the paper in Section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
The controller placement problem was firstly proposed in [4]
to decide how many and where controllers to be placed
in SDN to achieve scalability. More efforts were spent on
solving the controller placement problem [8], [12], [13] and
discussing the resilience and scalability of control plane.
However, as the important role that controller plays in net-
work, frequently mutation brings network extra burden of
performance.
The switch migration problem has been researched to
address the issue of the scalability of control plane. Refer-
ence [14] firstly proposed a migration protocol for seamless
migration of switches among multiple controllers. However,
how to select both the switches to migrate and the target con-
trollers was not described in detail. In [15], a dynamic switch
migration mechanism was designed for clustered controllers,
which guaranteed the sustainability of control plane even
when some controller crashed down. The aggregate load of
cluster should be collected before migration, which increased
the processing time. The switch migration problem was also
formulated as network utility maximization problem in [3]
with capacity constraints, and solved in a distributed manner
at each controller by taking approximation methods. At each
instant, the switch and the target controller were all randomly
selected. In [10], the switch migration problem was modeled
as a centralized resource utilization maximization problem
with constraints of CPU, bandwidth, and memory, and solved
by non-cooperative game theorymethod. Reference [11] built
a switch migration scheme based on greedy algorithm to
maximize the trade-off between migration costs and the load
balance rate. However, these schemes have not taken any
security challenges of control plane into account.
Referring to the security of control plane, some solutions
have been proposed to detect SDN distributed denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks by analyzing traffic patterns, e.g,
entropy of destination addresses [5], number of invalid pack-
ets per time window [16], distributions of different flow fea-
tures [17], [18], and so on. And the mitigation of attacks was
FIGURE 1. An illustration of SDN topology with multiple controllers.
mostly implemented as traffic migration by modifying flow
rules [19]. A load balancing scheme was proposed in [20] to
migrate traffic when DDoS occurs. But this method focused
on the overloaded links and released traffic burden by sim-
ply finding out the shortest path bypassing overloaded links
between switches.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we introduce the network model and attack
model, and also discuss the method to implement our system
in detail. We also describe a fundamental knowledge of the
EMD in this section aiming at clearly explaining our proposed
3-dimensional EMD model in Section IV.
A. NETWORK MODEL
Consider an SDN network with multiple controllers. Fig. 1
gives an illustration in detail, where there are 10 switches and
3 controllers in the network. Suppose that the physical loca-
tions of controllers are duplicate with switches, but function-
ally logically independent of each other [21]. As explained in
OpenFlow protocol v1.4.0 [22], controllers may have three
different kinds of roles, i.e., master, equal and slave. For a
network domain, there is only one master controller, which
facilitates automated network management. In our model,
a switch can only be controlled by one master controller, and
a controller can control more than one switch. At the same
time, there aremany alternative slave controllers for switches.
A slave controller will be selected as a new master if the
original master controller fails.
Let G(N , E) represent the network topology, where N
collects the vertexes (i.e., switches), E collects edges (i.e.,
connections between switches). The size of network is N ,
i.e., |N | = N , where | · | represents for cardinality.
P represents the set of controllers. |P| = P.
Many factors may impact the performance of controllers,
e.g., CPU, memory and throughput. Compared with the rest,
the processing of PACKET_IN events is generally regarded
as the significant part of controller load [3], [8], [23]. There
are also other types of packets that are sent from the switches
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to the controller, such as topology discover messages. In our
paper, we assume that loads of controllers are equal to the
total traffic for receiving all packets sent from switches. Each
switch is responsible for receiving traffic requests from end-
hosts that connect to it, and forwarding traffic as flow entries
indicate. When the flow table in the switch has no entry to
match traffic flow, the switch sends PACKET_IN packets to
the corresponding master controller to request the forwarding
strategies.
B. ATTACK MODEL
We suppose that strategically important located controllers
are those which control more switches and deal with more
traffic. In Fig. 1, controller C is a strategically important
located controller. In practice, these controllers usually play
important roles in a network, and become easier to be targeted
at attacks. As a result, how to protect these controllers from
attacks is an important issue.
Two kinds of attacks are considered in our paper. One
is reconnaissance attack, where adversaries can moni-
tor or eavesdrop traffic information of control plane. By
this means, they can recognize the strategically important
located controllers. Concerning the monitoring activities in
practice, we define the historically accumulative traffic of
controllers as the sum of traffic during monitoring inter-
vals. A bigger difference of historically accumulative traffic
between controllers means a larger gap of traffic loads they
deal with, which makes strategically important ones easier
to be identified. Consider the worst case, i.e., adversaries
have already recognized strategically important controllers.
In this case, our method aims at converting those strategically
important controllers into lightly important ones, to make the
ones adversaries have already recognized nomore trivial, thus
reduce the impacts on reconnaissance attacks. In practice,
adversaries can launch reconnaissance attacks by using a
compromised network tapping application in SDN. By this
means, they can eavesdrop the communication information
between the controllers, especially the clear text ones. For
example, adversaries can intercept the sFlow [24] datagrams
containing traffic statistics, which are sent by using the unen-
crypted UDP packets, to monitor the network.
The other attack we consider is saturation attack of control
plane. As defined by SDN, controllers are responsible for
maintaining the forwarding strategies of the network, and
the switches should request them by sending PACKET_IN
packets when they have no flow entry to match. This event
is especially utilized to adversarially saturate controllers in
SDN. The attackers can usually achieve this goal by spoofing
packet source or destination IP addresses, i.e., forging large
amounts of packets that the switches forwarding table can’t
match [6].
C. SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION
In general, as our algorithms are designed as logically cen-
tralized ones, they can reside in every controller in an SDN
environment.
FIGURE 2. Overview of system infrastructure.
We design that each controller has a global view of the net-
work, making independent decisions. The controllers should
maintain a traffic estimation module, which calculates the
historical traffic load during estimating intervals. Our algo-
rithms are triggered after at least one controller’s histori-
cal load is over a threshold that network administrator set
before the algorithms run, or on demand of administrators
in the network. After obtaining the solutions by running
our algorithms, controllers reassign the switches according
to the results. To avoid network conflicts, the controllers
only migrate the switches that are controlled by themselves
to other controllers. The process of reassignment can be
implemented as modifying roles of controllers [14]. After
migration, the controllers continue to repeat these steps for
another round of estimating and reassignment.
We explain the whole process in detail as Fig. 2 shown.
D. EARTH MOVER’S DISTANCE
EMD [25] is a well-known algorithm that is widely used to
measure the difference of two images [26]. The computation
of EMD is based on linear transportation problem, with an
objective ofminimizing transmission cost. The cost is defined
as the amount of earth transported by the distance.
In image applications, pixels are quantified as coordinates
for convenience of calculations. Suppose that figure P is
composed of m clusters, and P = {(p1, ωp1 ), · · · , (pm, ωpm )}
is the signature of P. pi represents cluster i, ωpi is the weight
of cluster i. Q = {(q1, ωq1 ), · · · , (qn, ωqn )} is the signature
of figure Q having n clusters. Moreover, dij is the ground
distance between pi and qj, which can be defined as the
Euclidean distance, or other distance measures. The objective




, of which fij denotes
the flow from pi to qj, making sure that the overall moving







The moving process should satisfy following constraints,
fij ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, 1 ≤ j ≤ n (2a)
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n∑
j=1
fij ≤ ωpi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m (2b)
m∑
i=1













where (2a) restricts that the flows can only move from P to Q
and not vice versa. (2b) restrains that the amount of earth that
can move out from pi should not exceed its weight ωpi . Also
qj cannot receive more earth than its weight ωqj , as shown
in (2c). (2d) forces to move the amount of earth as much as
possible.
In this context, the EMD is defined as the overall moving











IV. OPTIMAL SWITCH MIGRATION MODEL
In this section, we propose to interpret switch migration
problem as a signature matching problem to obtain optimal
solutions, and extend the traditional EMD algorithm into a
three-dimensional model to measure and reduce the differ-
ence of traffic load between controllers.
The historically accumulative traffic of each controller is
visualized as a signature, and the switches are migrated to
conform the signature to the one with even historical loads
across all controllers. We also interpret that a controller has
higher exposure probability if it deals withmore traffic during
historically monitoring intervals, and is also easier to be sat-
urated because the large amount of requests it receives from
switches. Thus the main goal of our algorithms is to equally
distribute traffic loads between controllers without exceeding
the capacities of them. By this means, historically important
controllers can be disguised and protected, delaying or even
preventing potential attacks.
A. OPTIMAL SWITCH MIGRATION MODEL FOR
DELAY-TOLERANT TRAFFIC
First consider delay-tolerant traffic. We denote v′i and v̄
′ as
historically accumulative traffic of each controller i and their
average, respectively. Similarly, denote vi and v̄ as currently




i=1 vi, i ∈ P .
The proposed algorithm attempts to conform the picto-
rial signature of the accumulative traffic of controllers to a
uniform one with even traffic of v̄ at every node by reas-
signing switches. To do this, we construct two signatures,
i.e., two one-dimensional distributions: {vi − v′i,∀i ∈ P},
{[v̄ − v′j]
+,∀j ∈ P}. The first signature {vi − v′i} provides
the traffic volumes that controller i supplies, i.e., the traf-
fic that controller i will receive in this monitoring interval.
The second signature {[v̄ − v′j]
+
} denotes the demand of
each controller to achieve evenly distributed traffic among all
controllers.
The EMD is then described to measure the difference






















= max(·, 0); xijk = 1 if switch k is migrated from
controller i to j, or xijk = 0, otherwise; θik = 1 when switch k
is currently controlled by controller i, or θik = 0, otherwise.
θik tk denotes the traffic controller i receives from switch k .
cij denotes the cost of migrating the switches from controller
i to j.
Keep in mind our goal to minimize the difference of accu-
mulative traffic between controllers. Meanwhile, the EMD
is inherently defined to minimize the difference. Therefore,
we define the cost of migrating as the normalized variance of






((vi − v̄)2 + (vj − v̄)2)
)
. (5)
Our EMD has a different form to the conventional defini-
tion mentioned in Section III-D. An auxiliary variable τ is
defined to indicate the gap between the total traffic load that
is expected to migrate and the total traffic that can migrate,
whereas there is no such gap for the conventional EMD. This
is due to the fact that the proposed switchmigration is discrete
and these two loads do not equate in most cases.
Given v′j, v̄
′, vj and v̄, we can formulate a binary linear
programming problem to minimize the EMD of the two













































θik tkxijk ≤ τ ; (6e)
xijk ∈ {0, 1} (6f)
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Here, constraint (6b) restricts a switch can only be migrated
from a controller to one controller; (6c) and (6d) restrict the
amounts of traffic that can be supplied and demanded by the
first and the second signatures, respectively; (6e) specifies
the maximum amount of traffic that can be migrated; and
(6f) specifies the variables to be binary.
Given τ , problem (6) is an integer linear program, and
can be optimally solved using a branch and bound/cut algo-
rithm [27]. A bisection method can be taken to recursively
search for the minimum feasible value of τ . When τ is
too small, (6) can become infeasible. When τ is large,
(6e) becomes inactive and (6) becomes always feasible. To
this end, (6) is an on-off function of τ preserving monotonic-
ity, and can be readily solved bisectionally.
Algorithm 1 Optimal Switch Migration Model for
Delay-Tolerant Traffic
Input: G(N , E); A; the set of controllers P; the time instant
T ; the accumulative traffic of each controller node v′i; the
current traffic of each switch tk ; and the initial θik (i ∈
P; k ∈ N ).
Output: θik , ∀i ∈ P, k ∈ N
1: repeat
2: Let vi = v′i +
∑
k∈N θik tk .
3: calculate v̄ = 1P
∑P
i=1 vi, and cij using (5);
4: substitute vi, v̄, v′i (i ∈ P), v̄′, cij and θik into the EMD
problem (6), and solve the problem optimally using the







k∈N θik tk ;
(i ∈ P; k ∈ N );
6: until next time instant.
Algorithm 1 describes in detail our algorithm.
As described, the kernel of the algorithm is the EMD prob-
lem (6) solved by using the binary branch and bound/cut
method in Step 4. The optimal solution for (6) is used to
update θik ; or in other words, to find the new assignments
of the switches, as depicted in Step 5. By repeating these
steps, the switches controlled by any heavily loaded con-
trollers move to those lightly loaded. The convergence of the
iterations can be guaranteed, since v̄ does not decrease during
the iterations while it is also obviously upper bounded.
B. OPTIMAL SWITCH MIGRATION MODEL WITH BOUND
CONSTRAINTS
We also consider our model to the delay-bounded traffic sce-
nario. There are many constraints in real network when con-
cerning the migration of switches. In this case, we describe
the demands of attaching constraints to our method and their
applicable scenes.
(i) Capacity Constraint
To prevent the controllers from saturation attacks,
we propose to add (7) into (6), which restrains the





















k=1 θi′k tkxi′ik is the traffic
migrated to i. ci represents the current traffic load of
controller i (not the accumulative traffic). In this way,
the loads of controllers are tightly restricted under their
upper bound of capacities.
Note that problem (6) may have no feasible solutions
when controllers cannot adjust their loads within the
limits of capacities, which results in overloading some
controllers. To avoid this, we can further reroute the traf-
fic of heavily-loaded controllers to middleboxes, which
are responsible for analyzing and detecting malicious
traffic, or just drop it. However, addressing this problem
is beyond the scope of our paper.
(ii) Bandwidth Constraint
The bandwidth of southbound is usually the bottleneck
of OpenFlow which is the most popular protocol in
SDN. In this case, we restrict the total bandwidth of
controller i’s southbound to be less than its upper bound













θik tkxijk ≤ Bi,
for any i ∈ P; (8)
(iii) Latency Constraint
The latency, in which we are particularly interested,
is the latency for the switches to request new flow rules
to the controller. A higher latency usually results in
the switches failing to install flow rules in time, which
impacts the efficiency and availability of the network.
Therefore, considering the quality of service (QoS) of
the network, we add the constraints of propagation
latency into (6) as follows.
djkxijk ≤ Lj for any j, k. (9)
Here, Lj is the maximum propagation latency of con-
troller j. djk represents the actual propagation delay of
the path from controller j to switch k . In our paper,
we formulate djk as the sum of the propagation delay of
each link along the actual path from j to k . In practice,
controllers determine the path from j to k , given the
current view of the topology. We simplify it by using the
traditional routing protocols, e.g., OSPF, to implement
the process of discovering the shortest path between j
and k in simulations.
The method to solve this QoS constrained model is
similar to the method we described.
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V. HEURISTIC SWITCH MIGRATION MODEL
In this section, we propose a heuristic model with reduced
computational complexity and time-efficiency. This model is
a simplified version of Algorithm 1 and decouples the three-
dimensional switch migration model with two concatenated
sub-problems, namely, traffic allocation and switch selection.
The traffic allocation is formulated as a signature match-
ing problem similar as the EMD model, which is a lin-
ear programming transportation problem. This problem is
designed to compute the amount of traffic to migrate, with
minimized cost. The switch selection is achieved by using
the aforementioned binary branch and bound/cut algorithm
after we solve the traffic allocation problem, but with a sub-
stantially smaller number of variables, i.e., less than N . As a
result, the complexity can be significantly reduced to solve
the transportation problem, facilitating applications to large-
scale networks.
We begin with optimizing variable yij, i ∈ N , j ∈ N ,
which represents the traffic to move from controller i to a
destination, i.e., controller j. Following the EMD criterion,
a linear programming problem can be formulated to deter-
mine the total traffic that needs to migrate from the heavily-


































yij ≤ τ ;
(10d)
which can be solved by using the Simplex method.
Here, (10b) restricts the traffic controller i moves out should
not exceed the amount it provides, i.e., vi − v′i. (10c) limits
the total traffic controller j receiving from other controllers is
lower than the difference between v̄ and v′j.
The set of solutions is denoted by
{
y∗ij, for any i, j ∈ P
}
.
A bisection search can also be taken to identify the minimum
value of τ to preserve the feasibility of (10).
As mentioned in Section III-A, before the switch migra-
tion, the traffic of each controller is composed by the num-
ber of requests sending by the switches controlled by the
controllers, i.e., vi − v′i =
∑
k,θik=1 θik tk . Given y
∗
ij, we can
proceed to select switch k that is controlled by controller i,
i.e., θik = 1, to redirect it from controller i to j. We formulate










θik tkzijk ≤ y∗ij; (11b)
zijk ∈ {0, 1} (11c)
which can be readily solved using the binary branch and
bound/cut.
We proceed to offload k controlled by controller with
maxi∈N vi. (11) is used to move out the switch first to the
controller with minj∈P vj, and then to the other controller in
increasing order of vj. This repeats for the other nodes in
decreasing order of vi.
Algorithm 2 summarizes the proposed computationally
efficient heuristic approach. Steps 3 and 4 execute the traf-
fic allocation, following the EMD criterion and using (10).
Steps 5 to 12 conduct the switch selection, using (11). These
two parts concatenate to reduce the complexity.
Algorithm 2 Heuristic Model for Delay-Tolerant Traffic
Input: G(N , E); A; the set of controllers P; the time instant
T ; the accumulative traffic of each controller node v′i; the
current traffic of each switch tk ; and the initial θik (i ∈
P; k ∈ N ).
Output: θik , ∀i ∈ P, k ∈ N
1: repeat
2: Run steps 2 to 3 of Algorithm 1
3: Substitute vi, v̄, v′i (i ∈ P), v̄′, cij and θik into (10), and
solve the problem using the Simplex Method;
4: Arrange {vi,∀i ∈ N } in decreasing order so that
vπ (1) ≥ vπ (2) ≥ · · · ≥ vπ (N ).
5: for i = 1, · · · ,N do
6: Let Q = ∪Kk=1{j, for which, θjk = 1}.
7: repeat
8: Let j∗ = minj∈P vj;
9: Offload traffic flows from node π (i) to j∗ by
solving (11) for zπ (i)j∗k , given y∗ij;
10: Update
Q← Q \ j∗;




j zπ (i)j∗k tk ;
vj← vj +
∑K
k=1 zπ (i)j∗k tk , ∀j ∈ P;
θπ (i)k ←
∑
k∈K θπ (i)kzπ (i)j∗k ;
θj∗k ←
∑
k∈P θj∗kzπ (i)j∗k .
11: until no switch can be further offloaded from node
π (i), or Q = ∅.
12: end for
13: until next instant.
Similar to Algorithm 1, we can also incorporate constraints
when applying this heuristic method.
(i) Capacity Constraint
Similar to (7), (12) shows the case with a capacity con-








yi′i ≤ Ci, for any i ∈ P (12)
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where ci denotes the current traffic load of controller i.∑P
j=1 yij denotes the amount of traffic moving out from
controller i, and
∑P
i′=1 yi′i represents the total traffic that
controller i receives. It limits the total traffic load of
controller i should be smaller than its upper bound.
(ii) Bandwidth Constraint
Considering the bandwidth of southbound, we proceed
to add constraint after (10) when dealing with the con-
straint of southbound bandwidth, as given by,






yi′i ≤ Bi, for any i ∈ P (13)
(ii) Latency Constraint
We can also proceed to add latency constraint, i.e., (9),
to (11), to ensure the QoS of network. And this problem
can also be solved by binary branch and bound/cut.
VI. SIMULATION AND EVALUATION
In this section, we simulate our proposed algorithms in
Section IV and Section V, and evaluate the effectivenesses
of these methods with different metrics.
A. EXPERIMENT SETUP
Random k-regular graphs was generated as network topolo-
gies, by using Python package Networkx [28], where the
degrees of nodes are k . Without loss of generality, we assume
that the traffic sent by the switches are random and uniformly
distributed at each time interval. Other traffic distributions,
such as Poisson distribution, can also be implemented, since
the proposed algorithm is general and applicable to different
types of traffic conditions. In our simulation, we set the
amount of traffic forwarded by the switches to the controller,
as loads of controller, as mentioned in Section III-A.
Simulations are run in a computer with 32G RAM and
6 cores of Intel Xeon CPU. We use IBM-CPLEX opti-
mizer [29] to solve linear programming problems developed
in Section IV and Section V.
B. EVALUATION METRICS
We assume that adversaries can identify strategically impor-
tant controllers by monitoring historically accumulative traf-
fic of controllers. In this case, the difference between loads of
controllers is utilized by adversaries to recognize strategically
important ones. Thus, we introduce a coefficient of variation
(CV) as a metric to evaluate the effectiveness of algorithms






where σ is the standard deviation and µ is the mean. CV is
also known as relative standard deviation (RSD), which is
a measure of the dispersion of distributions. A large value
of CV indicates a big difference between loads of the con-
trollers, which makes adversaries easy to recognize strategi-
cally important controllers.
FIGURE 3. Simulation results of network with 20 nodes and 3 controllers.
50 rounds of iterations.
Saturation attack is also considered, which is launched by
generating large number of PACKET_IN requests to con-
trollers. To evaluate the effectiveness of our methods to
this attack, we measure the load of controllers at any time
instant. When the load of controller is over its upper bound
of capacity, it will have higher risk of being compromised by
adversaries.
C. EXPERIMENT RESULTS
For comparison purpose, we simulate our proposed meth-
ods, i.e., Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2, together with other
algorithms, including the case of static network and the
switch migration-based decision-making algorithm (SMDM)
proposed in [11]. The model of static network is as such
that which the switch assignments do not change during the
whole process of simulation. Thus the results of static method
depend on the initial assignment of network. As to the SMDM
method, a variable δ is defined as the trigger of the switch
migration, i.e., the threshold of load diversity. We study the
impacts of δ on the final solutions by implementing SMDM
with different δ.
Firstly, we demonstrate the advantages of our proposed
methods on balancing load.
Fig. 3 compares the CV of accumulative traffic between
the algorithms in a 20-node network with 3 controllers. Each
line in Fig. 3 represents the average of 50 rounds of iterations,
and at each iteration the inputs of all algorithms are the same.
Each round of simulation has 500 times of traffic requests,
which can also be interpreted as 500 intervals of new traffic.
As the y-axis of Fig. 3 is set as log-scale, it amplifies the
differences between CVs, and the lines of Algorithm 1 and
Algorithm 2 are jagged. Fig. 3 shows that Algorithm 1 gains
the minimum CV and performs best. We also see that the
SMDM method with δ = 1.1 performs best among three
cases of SMDM. That is because δ represents the upper bound
of load diversity between controllers, and the load diversity is
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FIGURE 4. Simulation results of 20-node network with different number
of controllers.
FIGURE 5. Simulation results of different sizes of network. The number of
controllers is 3.
computed as the ratio of two controllers loads, i.e., vivj . When δ
is equal to 1, some pairs of controllers with small difference
are chosen as the outmigrating controllers and immigrating
controllers, respectively. This leads to a suboptimal case that
after migration, j is the outmigrating controller and i is immi-
grating controller. And the distribution of controllers’ loads
is still imbalanced. However, a bigger δ does not guarantee a
better result, such as the case of δ = 1.2 plotted in Fig. 3. This
is due to the fact that when δ is too big, some controllers are
not selected as the controllers tomigrate as their load diversity
is within the limits of δ.
To analyze the factors that may affect the performance of
the algorithms, we simulate the algorithms under different
network environments as Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 show. In these
simulations, the inputs of all methods at any time instant keep
unchanged.
Fig. 4 shows the results with different numbers of con-
trollers in a network. In this figure, each CV is obtained after
FIGURE 6. CDF of CV of different algorithms, with constraints of capacity
and latency.
abundant iterations, i.e., after the algorithms achieve conver-
gence. The y-axis of Fig. 4 is plotted at log-scale because the
values of SMDM are much greater than that of our proposed
methods.We can conclude from this figure that the number of
controllers has little influence on the final state of the network
in our proposed methods. That is because, after sufficient
iterations, the final result of our algorithm depends on the
network topology and the locations of controllers. Moreover,
the results of the proposed algorithms are typically in the
order of the power minus four and minus five. They are so
small that the differences between these points are visually
indistinguishable. At the same time, we can see that our algo-
rithms obtain a more balanced state than SMDM, regardless
of the number of controllers. Fig. 5 plots CVs with different
sizes of network. All of these networks have 3 controllers
and the topologies are generated as 4-regular graphs. It shows
that with the increase of network size, Algorithm 1 has lower
CV. And the CV of Algorithm 1 is critically reduced when
network size is getting larger.
By this means, we can conclude that our algorithms can
make it difficult for adversaries to identify strategically
important controllers, as the algorithms obtain the lower CV
and the accumulative loads of controllers are similar with
each other.
We evaluate the average computational time of the algo-
rithms at each iteration by running the algorithms repeatedly.
Table 1 shows the detail of our evaluation results. We can
conclude from this table that Algorithm 2 is far more time-
efficient against the growth of network size and the number
of controllers, which makes it suitable to be applied to large-
scale networks.
As mentioned in Sections IV and V, our proposed methods
can also deal with the situation with network constraints.
Fig. 6 shows the CDF of CV of the algorithms restrained by
different constraints. We represent ‘C’ as the upper bound
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TABLE 1. Average computational time (s) for different algorithms.
FIGURE 7. Rate of false identification for different algorithms.
of capacity, and ‘L’ as the maximum value of propagation
latency. We amplify two parts of Fig. 6 to clearly display
the results. Apparently, with looser limits of capacity and
latency, the algorithms can obtain better results. And under
the same constraint, Algorithm 1 obtains lower CV than other
algorithms. This is because the well-designed of Algorithm 1,
which always gets the optimal solutions within the limit of
constraints.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our methods against recon-
naissance and saturation attacks, we further evaluate our
methods with different attack models. Firstly, we consider
our methods against reconnaissance attacks. As mentioned
in Section III-B, we assume the worst-case reconnaissance
attack, i.e., the adversaries have already identified all strate-
gically important controllers by monitoring their traffic. In
this case, our methods can decrease the difference between
the controllers, thereby disguising the strategically important
controllers.
Particularly, we evaluate our methods using false identi-
fication rate, which defines the number of controllers that
are falsely identified by adversaries over the total number
of controllers. We also take the capability of attackers into
consideration, i.e., ‘‘AC’’ in Fig. 7. We set the x-axis of this
FIGURE 8. Probability of not being saturated for controllers.
figure as the monitoring interval, i.e., the number of time
instants that the adversaries keep monitoring the network.
The y-axis is set as the mean of false identification rates
during multiple monitoring intervals. In this figure, the dif-
ferent values of attack capability mean the different numbers
of controllers an adversary can recognize during one moni-
toring interval. From Fig. 7, we see that with the growth of
attack capability, adversaries can identify controllers more
accurately. Specifically, for algorithm 1, after 20 monitoring
intervals, adversaries can be confused and falsely identify
controllers at the rate of 0.8947, when AC = 1. When the
attack capability increases to two, the false identification
rate falls to 0.5565. Given the capability of attackers, our
proposedmethods can effectively confuse the adversaries and
decrease the number of controllers they identify. For example,
when attackers can recognize two controllers at a time, after
50 monitoring intervals, the average false identification rates
of Algorithms 1 and 2 are 0.5593 and 0.5527, respectively.
As to the SMDM method, the false identification rates go to
0.4933 and 0.5020 when δ is 1 and 1.1.
Furthermore, we evaluate the effectiveness of our meth-
ods against saturation attacks, as shown in Fig. 8. In this
simulation, we assume that the adversaries keep injecting
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flows that the switches cannot match according to their flow
tables into network to saturate controllers. We define the
probability that the controllers are not saturated during sim-
ulation. The inputs of all simulations in Fig. 8 remain the
same. We see that with the increase of controller capac-
ity, the probability of the controllers not being saturated is
increasing. It is worth noting that Algorithm 1 always keeps
the controllers under the restriction of their capacities, that is
to say that the controllers cannot be saturated whenwe exploit
this algorithm.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an elastic switch migration model,
which is based on three-dimensional earth mover’s distance
algorithm, to protect strategically important controllers from
reconnaissance and saturation attacks in SDN. This scheme
ensures optimal allocations of switches and minimal differ-
ence between controllers. A heuristic method is also designed
to reduce the computational complexities, enhancing the
scalability of switch migration for large-scale networks.
Simulation results show that our proposed methods can sig-
nificantly disguise important controllers against reconnais-
sance or eavesdropping by reducing the differences between
controllers. Saturation attacks can also be prevented, as the
switches are always migrated from highly-loaded controllers
to lightly-loaded controllers and within the limits of capaci-
ties of controllers.
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